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Abstract
Background We previously reported on a series of side errors
in cranial neurosurgery that occurred around the UK before
the year 2006. That survey was prompted by a cluster of six
cranial and spinal side errors that occurred in the neurosurgery
department in Newcastle upon Tyne during the year 2006. The
report was part of our investigation into the problem and how
to solve it.
Methods A human factors training programme was run in the
department in response to a further side error. All 125 mem-
bers of the neurosurgical theatre staff attended 1 of 5 training
days. Fifteen days of professional observation and coaching
were held within the theatre suite. Time between errors was
recorded. The success or otherwise of human factors measures
such as checking and briefing was observed.
Results A side checking system was adopted and became
universal. Pre-list briefing meetings were adopted and quickly
became widely used but took several years to become univer-
sal. Post-list debriefingmeetings were introduced but were not
widely adopted and quickly fell out of use. Mean time be-
tween side errors was 2 months pre-intervention, 18 months
after introducing a standardised checking system and 82 error
free months had passed since the human factors training
programme.
Conclusions Side errors in neurosurgery can be reduced by a
combination of systematic checking and education. We sus-
pect that education is useful in reducing error rates from low to
very low but, as is generally true of human factor interven-
tions, the evidence for this is soft.
Keywords Human factors . Crew resourcemanagement .
Side errors . Surgery . Briefing . Safety
Introduction
Operating on the wrong side is a special case of wrong site
surgery that is poorly tolerated by the general public because
of its easily understandable nature. The resulting sound bites
attract media coverage and public anxiety, often out of pro-
portion to any harm done, and lead to emotional or political
rather than scientific reactions that tend to be ineffective at
preventing recurrence.
Prior to the mid-1990s, wrong side surgery received little
scientific attention though was a recurring cause of litigation.
In 1997 the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons
(AAOS) formed a task force on wrong site surgery that
measured the incidence of such errors and began a “Sign Your
Site” campaign to promote preoperative site marking. This
was followed by similar campaigns by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, US Veteran’s
Health Administration, Canadian Orthopaedic and the North
American Spine Society Associations [1]. These highlighted
pre-operative site marking as a mainstay of error prevention.
The value of pre-operative site marking varies between surgi-
cal disciplines and is mixed in neurosurgery. Many neurosur-
gical operations, even when sided, are done through incisions
that are not side specific. The anterior cervical spine is usually
approached from the right side whichever side is the target of
the operation because it is easier for right-handed surgeons.
Similar situations are posterior approaches to the spine,
bifrontal and midline posterior fossa craniotomies and trans-
sphenoidal surgery. Among them these approaches account
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for a majority of operations done in most neurosurgery units.
Pre-operative site marking has become the norm in UK neu-
rosurgery over the past 10 years but these limitations mean it is
not a complete solution to the specific problem of side errors.
We have previously published a series of eight side errors
that occurred in cranial neurosurgical operations in the British
Isles between 1999 and 2006 [2], undoubtedly a small pro-
portion of total errors. Six side errors occurred in Newcastle
during 2006 including spinal and cranial operations and action
was taken to prevent recurrence. This involved a universal
“knife check” consisting of a verbal challenge response check
with at least two members of staff participating to confirm
patient identity, site and side immediately before the scalpel
was handed over to commence an operation. This reduced the
error rate from a high base by about nine fold but a further
error occurred. In this article we examine this error and action
taken to further reduce the error rate.
Materials and methods
Ethical approval was not required for this study. Our previous
paper was restricted to the analysis of cranial surgery side
errors. In this report our investigation was focussed on all side
errors, be they spinal or cranial and including operations that
were done on the wrong side through a midline incision such
as lumbar microdiscectomies and decompressive
foramenotomies or facetectomies.
Ascertainment of errors
We ascertained all errors that were reported via the critical
incident reporting system that was in use at the time. This
system detected two out of a total of six errors that we became
aware of during the calendar year 2006. The other errors were
identified on post-operative imaging in three cases and on
repeat surgery in one case. As with our previous report, the
nature of these errors and the requirement for confidentiality
put significant limitations on what details can be given.
In response to this series of errors we conducted the survey
published previously [2]. From this survey we designed a
checking system that would have trapped all errors that we
were aware of, had it been in use. This has become known as a
knife check. The check is a verbal challenge response check
between at least two members of staff with no paper record
being made. It is made immediately before the scalpel or other
instrument is handed to the surgeon to commence the proce-
dure, hence the term “knife check”. It involves a check that
information on imaging, the consent form and the patient
agree in name, date of birth, and operative site and side. In
the first 3 years we used date of birth only to supplement
identification but since 2009 we have also used the hospital
number. This check forms part or our implementation of the
Time Out of the WHO operative check list.
Implementation
A specific Monday was set to implement the knife check. The
intended implementation date was announced verbally and
with posters in theatres 1 week before the date. On the day
of implementation the head of neurosurgery (PM) spent the
day in theatre without having a list. He went round all theatres
reminding and ensuring that the knife check was carried out as
intended. This role was taken on by other surgeons for the
remaining days of the first week. All nursing staff, anaesthetic
staff and ODPs were encouraged to initiate such a knife check
if it had not been initiated by the surgeon. Scrub staff were
instructed not to hand over the scalpel until the check had been
completed to their satisfaction. It was intended to audit com-
pliance with the knife check after 1 month but in the event the
impression was that compliance had reached 100 % after
2 weeks. After the check had been in place for 2 weeks,
individual staff members were identified and asked to assess
compliance in theatres over a 2-day period. This assessment
showed the compliance had reached 100 %. A further assess-
ment was planned for 6 months later. This was originally
going to be conducted over 2 days but by the end of the first
day it was clear that compliance was 100 % and the check had
been embedded in the culture of the theatres.
A further error
No further errors were identified via any means including
critical incident reporting, revision surgery or post-operative
imaging during the 12 months following the introduction of
the knife check. A further error however did occur 18 months
after the knife check had been introduced.
An adult male patient was to have a posterior fossa crani-
otomy and removal of a left-sided meningioma. The operation
was being done by a registrar. The consultant in charge of the
case was involved in an emergency operation in another
theatre. He left the positioning to the registrar while he went
to assess progress with the other operation. He returned to
theatre to check on positioning. The head had been positioned
as for a right-sided operation but the consultant did not notice
the error and was not present when the knife check was done.
The wound was prepared and draped on the right-hand side.
The knife check was completed as normal. The anaesthetist,
scrub nurse and operating surgeon conferred on the name, date
of birth, and site and side of the surgery. They agreed that it was
to be a left operation and also agreed that it was the left side that
was prepared. Surgery continued accordingly. A right-sided
lateral posterior fossa incision was made and muscle dissection
began. The consultant returned to theatre before the skull had
been perforated, checked the scans and recognised the error. He
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halted the operation, pointed out the error and conducted a hot
debrief into how the error had arisen.
From the debrief it emerged that both the scrub nurse and
surgeon had left-right dyspraxia and normally had to stop and
think to check sides rather than knowing left from right
intuitively. This was compounded by the patient being prone.
It also emerged that the anaesthetist had checked the name and
date of birth of the patient from the consent form but had not
personally checked the operative site because he had been
located at the foot of the patient and the operative site was
obscured even when he was standing. It also emerged that
leading questions had been used in the knife check. The
significance of this was not appreciated at the time but several
months later it emerged that much of the department had fallen
into the habit of using leading questions for the knife check.
Following this incident and its investigation a meeting was
held with the aim of improving the checking system to prevent
a recurrence. The knife check itself had been fairly straight-
forward to design and implement but there was no agreement
on how to improve it further. It was agreed to seek expert help.
With this in mind we contacted the human factors depart-
ment at Cranfield University. We were put in contact with a
team of past and present BA pilots who were involved in
introducing human factors lessons learned in aviation into
health care (Atrainability). This commercial company pro-
vides training in human factors. The North East Strategic
Health Authority Patient Safety Group was approached and
funded a training programme. All employees involved in
neurosurgical theatres (125 employees in total) were given
the training that consisted of a 1-day course. Five such courses
were held over a period of 3 months. The courses were held
during working hours and a total of four full day operating
sessions were cancelled to accommodate them.
Together with the taught course, theatre coaching was also
used. For 15 days over a 3-month period (July–September
2009) Atrainability experts observed theatre behaviour and
advised as appropriate. The total cost of the intervention was
£45,000 + 4 theatre days. One of the authors (PM) spent 3 days
of purely passive observation of theatre behaviour during
October 2014 to assess long-term compliance.
Results
Course participants were polled on the utility of the course
within a week of their completion. The results of a total of 86
respondents are shown in Fig. 2.
Theatre observation
Several issues emerged from the theatre observation exercise
of 2009:
Knife check
The check was being done universally at the beginning of the
observation period but was variously referred to as a “knife
check” or “time out”. The check was being done reliably by
more than one person with a challenge-response format but
the initial challenge frequently involved leading questions
such as Is it the left side? rather than Which side is it? A
consequence of the training courses was that the significance
of leading questions was realised. It was realised that this had
contributed to the last error and furthermore that it was a quite
widespread practice. The knife check protocol was altered to
specifically avoid the use of leading questions.
Briefing
Pre-list briefing was done variably. Briefing rates increased
from around 10 % of lists at the beginning of the observation
period to around 90 % at the end. The benefits and skills of
briefing had been a part of the 1-day course. Briefing had not
been used at all before the courses were run and steadily
increased as more staff members had been through the course.
Debriefing
Debriefing was also covered in the course, which advocated
formal debriefing meetings at the end of operating lists. These
were tried. They had never been done prior to the intervention.
For an initial period of a few weeks during and after the
courses such meetings were held for up to 50 % of lists.
Medium- and long-term results: 3 months to 5 years
after the training programme
Knife check
The knife check remained universal.
Leading questions occasionally recur but are corrected
because of heightened staff awareness of the issue.
Briefing
The rate of briefing remained at around 90 % of lists until
2014. This was because a small minority of the consultant
surgeons used an alternative format to pre-list briefing for
team communication. This changed in the wake of a near miss
involving confusion over the order of cases on a list. During
October 2014, 15 all-day operating lists were observed. All
had briefings at 0830 a.m.
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Debriefing
By 6 months after the intervention, formal debriefing meet-
ings at the end of lists had fallen out of use completely. Staff
were asked the reasons for this failure. Two issues dominated
responses:
At the end of an operating list, different team members’
tasks end at different times so that there is no time for a
meeting that is convenient to everyone.
Debriefing has less immediacy as it is perceived to be
concerned with long-term process improvement rather than
the conduct of a specific list and therefore has lower priority
than briefing.
In response to the failure of formal debriefing we have
encouraged a system of hot debriefing, in which issues, good
or bad, are “debriefed” as soon as is practicable after they
arise. This system is not so amenable to uptake measurement
so data are lacking.
Error rates
No further side errors have been recorded. At the time of
writing the side error-free period is 82 months during which
time 25,812 procedures were performed in operating theatres
by the department. We do not have complete data electroni-
cally on sidedness of operations so a sample of 100 of these
were selected at random. Eighty-two of these were sided and
18 un-sided or midline. We therefore estimate a side error-free
run of approximately 21,000 sided operations. Time between
errors is shown in Fig. 1.
Follow-on training
It was anticipated from the beginning that the single intensive
training programmewould be effective for a period of time but
Fig. 1 Time between errors before intervention (2006), after the knife
check was introduced and after the training programme (Crew Resource
Management or CRM course as it was then called)
Fig. 2 Results of course participants’ feedback. Eighty-six respondents out of 125 total participants
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would become less effective as staff moved or memories
faded. It was therefore planned to implement regular update
training. At the time there was no training programme avail-
able at a manageable cost. A successful grant application was
made to the Health Foundation to develop such a course and
this course was published in 2013 [3, 4]. Implementation in
the Newcastle neurosurgical department has begun but a
formalised system of training of all the staff is still pending
(Fig. 2).
Discussion
The complexity of causative factors in human errors means
that we can never be certain whether the introduction of the
course was wholly responsible for the final diminution in the
side error rate. Furthermore it is expected that eventually
another error will be made and our goal of error monitoring
is to increase time between errors rather than eliminate errors
entirely.
Although our programme of human factors training was
triggered by the issue of side errors, the subject’s scope is far
wider than that with much greater potential benefits in terms
of patient safety, staff satisfaction, staff stress and work effi-
ciency. A number of factors limited our ability to measure
these changes. In particular fairly shortly after the course was
completed the neurosurgery department moved to a new hos-
pital with inevitable staff and environmental changes. Isolat-
ing effects of the course from the effects of the move is
therefore difficult.
Our experience with briefing was that it gained rapid, wide
and durable acceptance. Our experience with formalised
debriefing was the opposite. Even while pressure was being
applied to hold debriefing, penetrance into practice did not
exceed 50 % of lists and once pressure was removed it rapidly
and completely fell out of use. There are a number of reasons
for this including there being no time that is convenient to
everyone and the lack of immediate relevance of debriefing
and locating debriefing at the end of the working day brings
the potential for it to delay departure from the workplace.
Given our own experience it is perhaps not surprising that
research into the long-term effects of debriefing in surgery is
lacking. In theory briefing is about short-term operational
efficiency whereas debriefing is about long-term process im-
provement. Debriefing is of higher strategic but lower opera-
tional importance than briefing. Debriefing is supposed to
provide a negative feedback process control loop that pro-
motes practices that work and abandons those that do not.
These potential benefits justify further research. We are en-
couraging the hot debriefing system described but penetrance
and effectiveness assessment is pending. Other units have
experimented with a debriefing book where issues are entered
as they arise to be discussed at specific times though we have
not tried this.
Conclusions
Human errors in surgery are manageable. Where error rates
are unexpectedly high, simple measures can be effective, but
reducing rates from low to very low requires increased focus
and effort. It is uncertain whether this effort is merited on the
grounds of one narrow kind of error; however we consider the
benefits are far broader than the error that triggered the inter-
vention in our case and recommend increased awareness and
training in human factors to all health care teams.
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